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A NONDEFERENTIAL STANDARD FOR
APPELLATE REVIEW OF STATE LAW
DECISIONS BY FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS
The Rules of Decision Act' requires federal courts to apply state law in
cases that do not arise under the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the
United States. 2 When a party appeals a federal district court's interpretation
of state law to a federal circuit court of appeals, most federal appellate
courts traditionally have deferred to the district court's interpretation. 3 In In
re McLinn,4 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a
rehearing en banc, recently considered whether deference to the federal
district court's interpretation of state law is proper.
5
In re McLinn was a wrongful death and personal injury suit arising from
the collision of two skiffs near Kodiak Island, Alaska.6 One man died and
another received injuries as a result of the collision. 7 The decendent's father
and the injured man brought suit in admiralty in the United States District
Court for the District of Alaska against the owners and operators of the two
skiffs and the owners and operator of a third skiff.' At the time of the
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982) (Rules of Decision Act). The Rules of Decision Act states
that "The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United
States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide shall be regarded as rules of decision
in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." Id.
2. Id.; see Comm'r of Internal Revenue v. Stern, 357 U.S. 39, 45 (1958) (federal courts
must apply law of state when adjudication concerns state-created rights, obligations and
liabilities).
3. 19 C. WRIoHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4507
at 106-07 (1982).
4. 739 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
5. Id. at 1397. The panel of three judges that originally heard In re McLinn requested
an en banc determination of the appropriate standard of review because the judges found that
the standard of review was the controlling issue in the case. Id.; see infra note 14 (explaining
dispositive role of standard of review in McLinn).
6. 739 F.2d at 1397. The three skiffs in McLinn were all operating without lights at
speeds in excess of a local speed limit when two of the skiffs collided in the early hours of June
30, 1979. In re McLinn, 744 F.2d 677, 679-80 (9th Cir. 1984). Although only two skiffs collided,
at the time of the accident a third skiff was escorting one of the skiffs that collided. Id.
7. 744 F.2d at 679. Patrick Churchill died as a result of the collision that formed the
basis for the suit in McLinn. Id. Dale Carlough received injuries in the accident. Id. Both men
were passengers in the McLinn skiff. Id.
8. Id. at 680. In McLinn, the McLinn skiff belonged to the fishing vessel Fjord. Id.
William McLinn owned both the skiff and the Fjord. Id. At the time of the accident, McLinn's
son Russell was operating the skiff. Id. The McLinn skiff collided with a skiff that the defendant
Panamaroff was operating. Id. at 679. Michael Chichenoff, a friend of Panamaroff, was
operating a third skiff which served as an escort to the Panamaroff skiff, because the
Panamaroff skiff was experiencing engine trouble. Id. at 679-80. The Chichenoff skiff did not
collide with either of the other skiffs. Id. at 680. Gilbert and Jack Johnson owned the Chichenoff
skiff, which belonged to the Johnsons' fishing vessel Supersonic. Id. The plaintiffs Churchill
and Carlough brought suit against the McLinns, the Johnsons, Panamaroff and Chichenoff.
Id.
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accident, the third skiff had been escorting one of the two craft that collided. 9
The plaintiffs also brought suit against the fishing vessels to which the skiffs
belonged. 0
The owners of the escort skiff moved for summary judgment on both
their own liability and the liability of their fishing vessel." The district court
granted the motion for summary judgment and the plaintiffs appealed the
decision to the Ninth Circuit. 12 A three judge panel heard the appeal.' 3 The
panel determined that the outcome of the McLinn case depended on whether
the appellate court applied a deferential standard of review to the district
court's determination of state law or decided the state law issue de novo
without any deference to the district court's decision. 4 The Ninth Circuit
panel then requested a rehearing en banc to determine the appropriate
standard of review.' 5 In the en banc opinion in McLinn the Ninth Circuit
9. Id. at 679-80.
10. Id. The plaintiffs in McLinn brought suit in rem against the fishing vessels Fjord and
Supersonic. Id.; see supra note 8 (explaining relationship between parties, skiffs, and fishing
vessels in McLinn). Through an action in rem, a plaintiff can receive execution of the plaintiff's
maritime lien which arises at the moment of injury and attaches to the res causing the harm.
7A J. Moosta & A. PELAEz, MooPE's FEDERAL PRACTICE C.03 at 612 (1983).
11. 744 F.2d at 680. In McLinn, the owners of the escort skiff moved for summary
judgment pursuant to Rule 56(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See id.; FED. R. Civ.
P. 56(b). Rule 56(b) entitles a defendant to a judgment in defendant's favor without proceeding
through a trial on the merits when no genuine issue exists concerning any material fact and
applicable law authorizes judgment for defendant. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(b).
12. 744 F.2d at 680.
13. 739 F.2d at 1397.
14. Id. The issue whether the district court in McLinn should have granted summary
judgment depended upon the proper interpretation of the Alaska Owner Responsibility Statute.
744 F.2d at 681; FED. R. Civ. P. 56(b); see ALAsKA STAT. § 05.25.040 (1981). The Alaska
statute assigns liability to the owner of a watercraft for injuries caused by the craft's negligent
operation. ALASKA STAT. § 05.25.040 (1981). A vessel must be "devoted to recreational
pursuits," in order to constitute a "watercraft" within the meaning of the statute. ALASKA
STAT. § 05.25.100(4) (1981).
The district court in McLinn determined that the Alaska Owner Responsibility Statute did
not apply to commercial fishing vessels because commercial vessels were not devoted to
recreational pursuits. See 744 F.2d at 781. Thus, the owners of the escort skiff could not be
found liable under the statute because the skiff was a commercial vessel. Id. The plaintiffs,
however, argued that the Owner Responsibility statute created liability in the owner of any
vessel being used for recreation at the time of an accident. See id. at 682. The plaintiffs
contended that the owners of the escort skiff were liable under the statute because the operator
of the escort skiff was using the skiff for recreational purposes at the time of the collision. Id.
The Ninth Circuit panel determined that the plaintiffs' proposed interpretation of the statute
was only slightly more plausible than the meaning that the district court had attributed to the
statute. See id. at 683. Consequently, under a deferential standard of review, the Ninth Circuit
would affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment, but if the circuit court construed
the statute independently, as the circuit court would do under a de novo standard of review,
the Ninth Circuit would reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand the case for trial
to the district court. See id.; 739 F.2d at 1397.
15. 739 F.2d at 1397.
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recognized that in the past appellate courts ordinarily had deferred to a
district court's interpretation of state law unless that interpretation was
clearly wrong.' 6 As a general rule, however, federal appellate courts exercise
independent plenary review of a federal district court's legal findings.'7 The
McLinn court reasoned, therefore, that an appeal on an issue of state law
should entitle parties to the same de novo review that federal appeals courts
accord to issues of federal law.'
8
The Ninth Circuit noted in McLinn that the structural differences
between federal appellate courts and district courts demonstrate that de novo
review is the appropriate standard of review for district court determinations
of both federal law and state law. 9 The Ninth Circuit emphasized that
appellate courts do not hear evidence and therefore appellate courts are free
to concentrate on the legal issues.20 Another structural difference between
circuit courts of appeal and district courts is that three judges hear each case
at the appellate level, whereas a single judge presides in district court. 2' The
Ninth Circuit explained that the increased number of judges reduces the risk
16. Id. at 1398; see 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
2588 at 750 (1971) (federal trial court's determinations on questions of law are reviewable
without limitation).
17. 739 F.2d at 1397; see Jablonski By Pahis v. United States, 712 F.2d 391, 397 (9th
Cir. 1983) (Ninth Circuit will uphold construction of state law by federal district court unless
district court's construction is clearly wrong). The deference that federal circuit courts have
traditionally accorded to federal district court determinations of state law which are not "clearly
wrong" has resulted in confusion because of the similarity between the phrases "clearly wrong"
and "clearly erroneous." See IA J. MOORE, W. TAGGART, A. VESTAL & J. WICKER, MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 309[2] at 3128 n.28 (1983). Appellate courts apply the "clearly wrong"
standard in reviewing district courts' state law interpretations while appellate review of a trial
court's factual findings requires use of the "clearly erroneous" standard. WRIGHT, MILLER &
COOPER, supra note 3, at 106-10; see FED. R. Crv. P. 52(a) (trial court's findings of fact must
not be set aside on review unless findings are clearly erroneous). Scholars in the law of procedure
agree that since state law matters are questions of law, courts should not review district courts'
state law decisions under the clearly erroneous standard which applies to questions of fact.
WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 3, at 106-10; MOORE, supra, at 0.309[2] at 3127-28
n.28 (1983). Although the McLinn majority and dissent agreed that the Ninth Circuit should
cease using the "clearly wrong" standard of review, the majority and dissent disagreed on
whether any deference to the district court's determinations of state law was appropriate. See
739 F.2d at 1402.
18. See 5A J. MOORE & J. LucAs, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 52.03[2] n.1; Bose Corp.
v. Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc., -U.S.-, 104 S. Ct. 1949, 1959-60 (1984) (de
novo appellate review of federal district court's legal conclusions was proper though clearly
erroneous standard of review governed factual determinations); Stevenot v. Norberg, 210 F.2d
615, 619 (9th Cir. 1954) (appellate court is free to draw own conclusions regarding legal effect
of district court's factual findings).
19. 739 F.2d at 1398.
20. Id.; see 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 16, § 2585 at 732 (appeals court does not
consider evidence de novo).
21. 739 F.2d at 1398; see Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S.
247, 254 (1953) (circuit courts of appeals traditionally have three-judge panels).
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of error at the appellate level.22 In addition to noting that an appellate court
enjoys a larger bench and the freedom from hearing evidence, the Ninth
Circuit also reasoned that because a federal appellate court's decisions have
precedential impact on state law issues, a nondeferential standard of review
is appropriate. 23 The McLinn court concluded that the precedential impor-
tance of federal appeals courts' opinions regarding state law confers a weighty
responsibility on the courts of appeals to give de novo review to all legal
decisions of the federal district courts. 24
Despite all of the factors favoring a de novo standard for appellate
review of district courts' state law determinations, the Ninth Circuit noted
in McLinn that appellate courts customarily have given only one reason for
applying a deferential standard of review.Y The traditional justification for
the deferential standard of review of state law determinations is that a federal
district judge is more likely than a federal appellate judge to have practiced
law in the state, and thus, the district judge generally is more familiar with
state law. 26 The Ninth Circuit in McLinn, however, criticized this traditional
justification, noting that a district court judge should be able to articulate
the basis for the judge's interpretation of state law by reference to legislative
materials, commentaries on the law, and judicial opinions. 27 The McLinn
majority28 further stated that reliance on the district judge's experience
transfers attention from the basis of the decision to the judge's biography.
29
The Ninth Circuit in McLinn supported its position that the federal court
22. 739 F.2d at 1398; see F. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE 1, 58 (1980) (three judges are
likely to provide decision superior to decision of a single judge).
23. 739 F.2d at 1401-02. When no state court has ruled on the meaning of a state statute,
a federal district court will follow the construction of a federal circuit court of appeals in
attempting to determine the proper interpretation of the state statute. MooRE, supra note 17,
0.309(2) at 3122, 3123 n.19.
24. 739 F.2d at 1401-02.
25. Id. at 1399; see 9 WIoH & MILLER, supra note 16, at 752 (federal appellate courts
often accord deference to district court determinations of state law because of district judge's
expertise in state law).
26. Id.; C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL CoURTS § 58 at 271 (3d ed. 1976) (federal district judges
generally are more familiar than federal appellate judges with state law); see Note, Deference
to Federal Circuit Court Interpretations of Unsettled State Law: Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts,
Inc., 1982(4) DUKE L.J. 704, 711 (rationale for federal appellate court's d~ference to district
court's interpretation of state law is district judge's experience with state law, which appellate
judge may lack).
27. 739 F.2d at 1400.
28. Id. The McLinn majority included six of the eleven Ninth Circuit judges who made
up the en banc panel. Id. at 1397 & 1403. The remaining five judges joined in a dissent. Id. at
1403; see infra notes 34-53 and accompanying text (discussion of dissenting opinion in McLinn).
29. 739 F.2d at 1400. The majority in McLinn criticized the policy of deference to district
courts' determinations of unsettled state law based on a district court judge's experience with
state law because, according to the majority, such a rationale relies on personal characteristics
which the record does not reveal. Id. The majority also decried as both inefficient and improper
the resulting tendency to place the judge's experience in issue in determining whether an
appellate court should defer to a district court. Id.
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system requires full de novo review at the circuit court level by citing United
States Supreme Court cases in which the Court declined to review state law
issuesA0 In the Supreme Court cases cited by the Ninth Circuit, however, the
Court deferred to the appellate court's decision, rather than the district
court's determination of the state law issues. 3' Although the Supreme Court
has the option of declining review of a federal district court's state law
determinations because review has already taken place at the appellate level,
federal courts of appeals must review state law issues de novo because the
appellate courts are charged with providing initial review of all legal ques-
tions.3 2 The McLinn majority viewed a de novo standard of appellate review
as essential to the federal court system as a whole, since plenary review of
state legal questions in the circuit court permits the Supreme Court to
conserve the Court's resources for questions of national scope.
33
The McLinn dissent disagreed with the majority view that a nondefer-
ential standard of review of state law determinations was necessary to
preserve the parties' rights of review.3 4 Although the dissent agreed that
federal appeals courts must exercise de novo review of all legal issues, the
dissent stated that appellate courts could exercise de novo review of all legal
issues and still defer to the determination of the district court on state law
issues.35 The dissent cited the decision of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit in Luke v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co.
36
as an example of a case in which a federal appeals court saw no conflict
between the responsibility of an appellate court to review all questions of
law and the adoption of a deferential standard of review for district court
determinations of state law.
37
In Luke, the Eighth Circuit considered whether to give deference to an
interpretation of South Dakota law by the United States District Court for
the District of South Dakota.38 Specifically, the district court had held that
30. Id. at 1399; see Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 58 (1979) (Court declined to
review decision of Fourth Circuit reversing United States District Court for Western District of
North Carolina on unsettled issue of North Carolina law); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160,
181 (1976) (Court upheld Fourth Circuit's affirmation of decision by United States District
Court for Eastern District of Virginia regarding Virginia law issue).
31. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 58 (1979) (Court deferred to Fourth Circuit's
decision reversing district court's determination of North Carolina law); Runyon v. McCrary,
427 U.S. 160, 181 (1976) (Court deferred to Fourth Circuit rather than district court in declining
to review Fourth Circuit's affirmation of district court's Virginia law interpretation).
32. 739 F.2d at 1399-1401; see 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982) (granting jurisdiction to courts of
appeals over final decisions of district courts); infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text (rationale
that conservation of judicial resources requires deference to district court determinations of
state law applies to Supreme Court but not to federal appellate courts).
33. 739 F.2d at 1399-1400.
34. Id. at 1404.
35. Id.
36. 476 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1973).
37. 739 F.2d at 1406; see Luke v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 476 F.2d 1015, 1019
n.6.
38. 476 F.2d at 1019, n.6.
19851 1315
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under South Dakota law an insurance company's good faith refusal to
defend a claim against an insured was a valid defense to the insured's
subsequent action against the insurance company.3 9 The Luke court noted
that in prior cases the Eighth Circuit had stated that the district court's
interpretation of a matter of state law bound the court of appeals. 4° The
Eighth Circuit noted, however, that commentators on the law of procedure
had criticized the rule that a federal trial court's state law decision bound
the federal appellate court.4 1 The Eighth Circuit in Luke acknowledged that
although a federal court of appeals has a duty to review a district court's
determinations of state law, the appellate court may give great weight to the
trial court's opinion on state law issues.4 2 Based on Luke and other supporting
decisions, the McLinn dissent found no conflict between a federal appellate
court's duty to review issues of law and the need to give deference to the
trial court's construction of state law.
43
The McLinn dissent also viewed as legitimate the traditional acknowl-
edgment accorded to a district court judge's experience with matters of state
law. 44 As an indication of district court judges' greater familiarity with state
39. Id. at 1018-22. In Luke v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., the insured held an
American Family Mutual policy that provided for coverage of a newly-acquired car without an
additional premium only if American Family Mutual provided coverage for all other cars that
the insured owned. Id. at 1017. At the time of the accident involving the insured's newly-
acquired car, the insured held title to a car which was not operable and for which the insured
had not purchased insurance. Id. at 1017-18. Therefore, American Family Mutual refused to
defend a claim against the insured arising from an accident involving the insured's new car. Id.
The insured brought suit against American Family Mutual for failing to settle within the limits
of the policy. Id. The trial court found that although American Family Mutual had an obligation
to defend the claim, the Company acted in good faith in failing to defend and to settle the
claim. Id. at 1018.
40. Id. at 1019, n.6.
41. Id. Legal scholars have criticized the rule that some federal circuit courts of appeals
have applied, which gives the state law decisions of a federal district court binding effect on
the federal appellate court. See MOORE, supra note 17, 0.309[2] at 3128 n.28; C. WRIoHT,
LAW OF FEDERAL CouRTs, supra note 26, § 58 at 271.
42. 476 F.2d at 1019 n.6. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in
Luke chose to follow the rule of the Fifth Circuit, which calls for review of the trial court's
state law decisions in the same manner as any other legal determination, yet gives great Weight
to the trial court's opinion. Id.; see Freeman v. Continental Gin Co., 381 F.2d 459, 466 (5th
Cir. 1967) (expressing Fifth Circuit's policy toward review of district court determinations of
state law).
43. 739 F.2d at 1404. Many federal courts of appeals have stated that a federal district
court's determination of state law is entitled to "great weight." E.g., O'Brien v. Heggen, 705
F.2d 1001, 1005 (8th Cir. 1983); Lamb v. Briggs Mfg., A Div. of Celotex Corp., 700 F.2d
1092, 1094 (7th Cir. 1983), Avery v. Maremont Corp., 628 F.2d 441, 446 (5th Cir. 1980). Other
federal circuit courts have used the phrase "substantial deference" to define the appropriate
standard of review for a district court's determinations of state law. E.g., In re Big River Grain,
Inc., 718 F.2d 968, 970 (9th Cir. 1983); Caspary v. Louisiana Land and Exploration Co., 707
F.2d 785, 788 n.5 (4th Cir. 1983); Renfroe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 686 F.2d 642, 648 (8th Cir.
1982).
44. Id. at 1405; see 19 WRIGHr, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 3, § 4507 at 106-07 (district
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law, the dissent observed that while a federal district judge sits within a
single state, the Ninth Circuit embraces nine states.4 5 The dissent also noted
that the Supreme Court traditionally has relied on the greater state law
experience of lower court judges in declining to review matters of state law.
46
Following the rationale that a federal appellate court should defer to a
district court judge's greater state law experience, a number of federal circuit
courts of appeal have stated that an appellate court should accept the decision
of a federal district court concerning state law unless the decision is clearly
wrong. 47 The McLinn dissent conceded that federal appellate courts' use of
a "clearly wrong" standard of review of federal district courts' state law
decisions had generated considerable confusion.4 8 Since the phrase "clearly
wrong" is so similar to the "clearly erroneous" standard which governs
review of district courts' factual determinations, the "clearly wrong" phrase
appears to preclude de novo review of state law issues by appellate courts.
49
The dissent in McLinn nevertheless asserted that courts of appeals for the
most part had not abdicated their responsibility to review the validity of
district courts' conclusions regarding state law.
50
The McLinn dissent concluded that the majority's rejection of a defer-
ential standard of review would reduce the incentive to district court judges
to elucidate their state law decisions because the circuit court's independent
judge's experience with state law is traditional justification for federal appellate court's deference
to district judge's opinion on matters of state law).
45. 739 F.2d at 1405.
46. Id. at 1406 (citing United States v. Durham Lumber Co., 363 U.S. 522, 527 (1960)).
In United States v. Durham Lumber, the appellant challenged the Fourth Circuit's affirmation
of a decision by the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina on
an issue of North Carolina law. Id. at 526. The Supreme Court stated that the Court generally
was unwilling to disturb the state law interpretations of federal courts skilled in the law of
particular states. Id. at 526-27. Therefore, the Court would not reverse the Fourth Circuit, since
the appellate court was "closer" than the Supreme Court to North Carolina law. Id. The
McLinn dissent viewed the Supreme Court's decision in Durham Lumber as legitimizing
deference to a federal district court's determination of state law because a district judge is
"closer" to state law than a circuit judge is. See 739 F.2d at 1406.
47. See, e.g., Chavez v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 547 F.2d 541, 543 (10th Cir. 1977)
(district court's interpretation of state law stands unless interpretation is clearly erroneous);
United States v. Pollard, 524 F.2d 808, 810 (9th Cir. 1975) (appellate court will not overturn
district court on state law construction unless construction is clearly wrong); Lee Shops, Inc. v.
Schatten-Cypress Co., 350 F.2d 12, 17 (6th Cir.) (only question on appeal of district court
decision on state law matter is whether district court reached permissible decision), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 980 (1965).
48. 739 F.2d at 1405-06; see supra note 17 (explaining confusion of "clearly wrong"
standard of review for federal district courts' state law determinations with "clearly erroneous"
standard of review for trial courts' factual findings).
49. 739 F.2d at 1404; see 19 WIGr, MrLLER & COOPER, supra note 3, § 4508 at 106-10
("clearly erroneous" standard accords too much significance to trial court's determination of
state law, since parties have right to meaningful review on appeal).
50. 739 F.2d at 1404.
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review would make thorough explanation by the trial court superfluous."
The dissent characterized the majority's holding in McLinn as affording no
consideration to the district court's decisions on state law.12 Further, the
dissent noted that appeals would increase because of the greater likelihood
of a reversal under the new standard of review.
5 3
Although the McLinn court was divided in its opinion regarding the
effect of a nondeferential standard of review of district courts' determinations
of state law in the federal court system, the majority and the dissent agreed
that the right of appeal demands that federal courts of appeal review state
legal issues de novo.14 Similarly, the majority and dissent agreed that de
novo review is inconsistent with the "clearly wrong" standard of review that
the Ninth Circuit often has applied in the past.5s The central issue on which
the dissent and majority disagreed was whether an appellate court may defer
to the district court's interpretation of state law.
6
The traditional argument in favor of deference to the district court on
matters of interpretation of state law is that district court judges are more
familiar with the law of the state in which they sit.17 Prior to appointment
to the bench, a district court judge usually has practiced law within the state
where the district is located.58 Federal appellate judges are slightly less likely
51. Id. The McLinn majority disagreed with the dissent's contention that district court
judges would devote less effort to construing state law under a nondeferential standard of
review. Id. at 1403. According to the majority, the nondeferential standard of review does not
dissuade district judges from vigorously pursuing the proper construction of federal law,
although appellate courts do not accord deference to district judges' constructions of federal
law on review. Id. at 1397 & 1403. Therefore, the majority saw no reason to anticipate that
district judges would reduce efforts to construe state law under the nondeferential standard of
review. Id.
52. 739 F.2d at 1404. The McLinn majority disputed the McLinn dissent's statement that
the majority's refusal to defer to the district court gave no consideration to the district court's
construction of state law. Id. at 1403. The majority stated that the Ninth Circuit would
thoroughly consider the reasoning of a district court on matters of state law just as any federal
court of appeals considers a district court's reasoning on matters of federal law. Id.
53. Id. at 1406. The McLinn dissent asserted that the majority's nondeferential standard
of review of district court determinations of state law would create more work for the Ninth
Circuit because the new standard would encourage appeals due to the increased likelihood of
reversal on state law issues. Id. The majority, however, considered the conservation of judicial
resources an insufficient justification for retaining a deferential standard of review. Id. at 1398.
The majority reasoned that the parties' right to complete review of legal questions dictated a
nondeferential de novo standard of review for district court determinations of both state and
federal law matters. Id.
54. Id. at 1401, 1402 & 1404.
55. Id. at 1400 & 1405.
56. Id. at 1401 & 1402.
57. See 19 WLIHrT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 3, § 4507 at 106 (federal district
judge's experience with law of state in which district is located is rationale for appellate
deference to district court determination of state law).
58. 739 F.2d at 1405; see Note, supra note 26, at 711 (district judge usually has practiced
law in state where district is located).
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to have practiced law in the circuit prior to their appointment.5 9 Once on the
bench, however, a federal appellate judge spends a smaller percentage of
time than does a district judge resolving state law matters from any one
state, because each circuit encompasses several statesA
0
The Supreme Court occasionally has referred to the state law experience
of the lower court judges as a reason for the Court's refusal to disturb the
rulings of the lower courts. 6' The Court traditionally has not deferred to a
federal district court ruling on a state law issue, however, if the appellate
court has not concurred in the judgment. 62 In contrast, in Bernhardt v.
Polygraphic Co.,63 the Court deferred to the judgment of the federal district
judge concerning the interpretation of a state law issue, and remanded the
case to the district court rather than to the court of appeals.6
4
59. See W. DoRNETTE & R. CROSS, FEDERAL JUDIcIARY ALMANAC (1984) (3 of 23 Ninth
Circuit judges in 1984 had no bar or bench experience in any state within circuit prior to
appointment to circuit court).
60. See Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 285 (2d Cir. 1981) (Mansfield,
J., dissenting). Judge Mansfield, in his dissent in Factors Etc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., asserted that
a federal court of appeals usually will not develop expertise in the law of any state because
diversity suits, which require the application of state law, are typically only a small percentage
of the cases that come before a court of appeals. Id. Mansfield noted that in 1980, diversity
suits accounted for only 12.5% of the cases before all the federal courts of appeals. Id. For the
Sixth Circuit in 1980, only 11.6% of the appeals that the court heard were diversity suits, and
that 11.6% required the court to apply the law of the seven different states within the circuit.
Id.
61. See, e.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 345 (1976) (Supreme Court noted state law
experience of North Carolina federal district judge in Court's decision to leave holding below
undisturbed); United States v. Durham Lumber Co., 363 U.S. 522, 527 (1960) (Court hesitates
to overrule state law decisions by lower federal courts ski'Ied in law of particular states);
Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 486-87 (1949) (same); Estate of Spiegel v. Comm'r, 335 U.S.
701, 707 (1949) (Court noted Illinois law experience of Seventh Circuit judge as factor in Court
upholding decision below); Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154, 163 (1942) (Court declined to
overturn Seventh Circuit on Illinois law determination when judge with considerable legal
experience in Illinois participated in decision and circuit included Illinois); MacGregor v. State
Mutual Life Assurance Co., 315 U.S. 280, 281 (1942) (when no Michigan court decision on
issue existed, Court deferred to decision by federal district judge within Michigan and three
Sixth Circuit judges whose circuit included Michigan).
62. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 345-46, 346 n.10 (1976). Although the Supreme
Court in Bishop v. Wood referred to the North Carolina legal experience of the district judge,
the Court also noted that the Fourth Circuit had concurred with the district court. Id. In
Durham Lumber Co., the Supreme Court referred generally to the state law experience of the
lower federal courts, but throughout the Court's opinion are references to the federal appellate
court opinion rather than the district court opinion. United States v. Durham Lumber Co., 363
U.S. 522, 526-27 (1960); see supra note 46 (discussing United States v. Durham Lumber Co.).
Similarly, in Propper v. Clark, though the Court referred generally to the state law experience
of the lower federal court judges, the Propper Court also stated that the Court relied on the
circuit court's determination of the state law issue. Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 486-87 &
490 (1949).
63. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
64. Id. at 204-05.
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In Bernhardt, a Vermont plaintiff brought suit against a New York
defendant for breach of an employment contract. 5 The defendant caused
the suit to be removed to federal court on diversity grounds. 66 The contract
included a provision for arbitration of any dispute according to New York
law. 67 The United States District Court for the District of Vermont ruled
that Vermont law governed the suit, and that the arbitration agreement was
revocable under Vermont law.68 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, however, held that the United States Arbitration Act
69
required a stay of any case in federal court pending the outcome of
arbitration.
70
The Supreme Court determined that since arbitration affected the sub-
stantive rights of the parties, Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins7' required that
the law of the forum state apply in a diversity suit such as Bernhardt.72 The
parties agreed at oral argument that no developments having an effect on
Vermont arbitration law had occurred, and therefore the precedents on which
the district court relied remained valid.73 The Court ruled that because the
Vermont law on arbitration appeared clear, no reason existed to remand the
case to the Second Circuit for review of the district court's decision. 74 Thus,
the Court remanded the suit to the district court to determine the remaining
Vermont conflict of laws question.
7
-
Justices Frankfurter and Harlan concurred in the Bernhardt result but
stated that the Court should have remanded the case to the Second Circuit
65. Id. at 199. In Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., the parties entered into the employment
contract in New York, and the plaintiff subsequently moved to Vermont. Id.
66. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982) (granting jurisdiction to federal courts where amount
in controversy exceeds $10,000 and parties are citizens of different states); id. at § 1441
(defendant may remove action from state to federal court when federal court has original
jurisdiction over action).
67. 350 U.S. at 199 (Bernhardt parties entered into contract in New York).
68. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 122 F. Supp. 733, 734-35 (D. Vt. 1954), rev'd, 218
F.2d 948 (2d Cir. 1955), rev'd, 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
69. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1982) (United States Arbitration Act).
70. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 218 F.2d 948, 951 (2d Cir. 1955), rev'd, 350 U.S. 198
(1956).
71. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
72. Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 204. Under the doctrine set forth in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,
federal courts must apply state law in preference to federal law in a diversity action whenever
the application of federal law would alter a substantive right which the parties have under state
law. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); see IA J. MooRE, MooRE's FEDERAL
PRACTiCE 0.304 at 3039 (2d ed. 1978) (discussion of Erie doctrine).
73. 350 U.S. at 204.
74. Id. at 205. In Bernhardt, the Court indicated that deference to the district court
determination would be inappropriate if subsequent state court decisions modified the authority
that the district court had relied on. Id. at 204. Other factors that would make deference to the
lower court inappropriate included doubts, ambiguities or dicta in the existing state court
opinions, and legislative developments that boded a change in prior law. Id.
75. Id. The district court in Bernhardt had not ruled clearly on what the Vermont conflict
of laws rule was and thus that issue remained to be decided upon remand. Id.
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rather than the district court.7 6 The Second Circuit had not determined the
proper construction of Vermont arbitration law because of the circuit's view
that federal law was controlling. 7 The Supreme Court's remand to the
district court to decide the conflict of laws question therefore precluded any
appellate review of the district court's Vermont arbitration law decision.7 1
Justice Frankfurter observed that the parties in Bernhardt had a right to
review of the district court's determination which the Court's remand to the
district court foreclosed.
7 9
Although the Supreme Court's remand of the Bernhardt case to the
district court would seem to indicate that district court opinions on state law
matters deserve considerable weight, the Court in Bernhardt stressed the
settled quality of Vermont arbitration law.80 In a case where no state court
has decided the issue at hand, Bernhardt may not apply.' Moreover, the
Court's deference to lower courts in state law matters reflects the Court's
need to conserve its judicial resources for deciding constitutional and federal
statutory questions.8 2 While the Supreme Court properly exercises discretion
in choosing matters for review, the federal appellate court's jurisdiction is
almost exclusively obligatory. 3 Therefore, the Court's pronouncements about
76. Id. at 212 (Frankfurter, J. & Harlan, J., concurring).
77. See 218 F.2d 948, 951 (2d Cir. 1955) (Second Circuit in Bernhardt held that federal
law controlled arbitration issue).
78. 350 U.S. at 211.
79. Id. at 212. In Bernhardt, Justice Frankfurter considered that in view of the long
period of time since Vermont courts had ruled on arbitration provisions included in a contract,
and the change in attitude towards arbitration that had occurred among courts in other states,
the Second Circuit might have found that a Vermont court would rule differently from the
federal district court on the arbitration question. Id. at 211-12. Therefore, Justice Frankfurter
thought that the Court should have remanded the case to the Second Circuit for review. Id. at
212.
80. Id. at 205.
81. See Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U.S. 232, 236-37 (1944). In Huddleston, an Oklahoma
Supreme Court decision cast doubt upon a prior determination of Oklahoma law by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Id. at 235-36. In remanding the case to the
Tenth Circuit, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that circuit courts as well as trial courts have a
duty to ascertain the controlling state law. Id. at 236.
82. See Note, Unclear State Law in the Federal Courts: Appellate Deference or Review?,
48 MINN. L. REv. 747, 756 (1964) (reason for Supreme Court's deference to lower federal
courts' determinations of state law is need to reserve court's effort for more important issues).
In a discussion of the Judiciary Act of 1925 which transferred a large part of the Supreme
Court's responsibilities for deciding particular types of cases to other federal courts, Justice
Taft explained that litigants' rights were sufficiently protected by the opportunity for trial and
review of the trial's outcome at the circuit court level. Taft, The Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court Under the Act of February 13, 1925, 35 YALi L.J. 1, 2 (1925); see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1251-
94 (1976) (Federal Judiciary Act of 1925). Justice Taft stated that the function of the Supreme
Court is to decide cases of national importance, rather than to correct errors affecting only
individual litigants. Taft, supra at 2.
83. See Hellman, Error Correction, Lawmaking and the Supreme Court's Exercise of
Discretionary Review, 44 U. Prr. L. REv. 795, 806 (1983) (contrasting obligatory jurisdiction
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reliance on the judgment of lower courts regarding state law issues may not
have prescriptive value for the courts of appeals, because appellate courts
perform a different function than the Supreme Court does. 84
Although Supreme Court decisions provide no clear guidance about
whether federal appellate courts should defer to federal district courts on
matters of state law, commentators have argued that underlying the Erie
doctrine is the assumption that federal judges are approximately as able to
determine state law issues as state judges.85 A judge's experience in applying
state law need not be dispositive because federal judges have the benefit of
the same written sources of interpretation that are available to state judges.1
6
Likewise, federal appellate judges have the same resources at their disposal
as federal district judges.8 7 Particularly when the state law is unclear, a
reliance on concrete sources of the law seems preferable to a reliance on
assertions from one individual judge, no matter how experienced and well-
respected. Because the legal basis for decision and the district court's
interpretation of that basis are available to the appeals court, the appellate
panel should be able to fully evaluate the lower court's determination without
a need to defer to the district court's decision.88
Although judicial economy may provide a valid basis for the Supreme
Court's deferential treatment of lower federal courts' determinations of state
law questions, judicial economy cannot justify an appeals court's retreat
from the court's duty to provide meaningful review of cases involving state
law issues.8 9 While the Supreme Court has discretion to refuse to review
matters of purely state law, litigants have a statutory right to review by the
courts of appeals. 90 Thus, deference by the Supreme Court to lower federal
courts on state law matters provides no support for similar deference by
federal appellate courts to federal district courts.9' On the contrary, the right
of circuit court with Supreme Court's discretion to select cases for plenary review); 15 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3901 at 398 (1976)
(jurisdiction of circuit courts is almost entirely obligatory).
84. See supra notes 82-83 (although federal appellate courts have obligation to review
district court decisions, Supreme Court's function is limited to review of matters of broad
public interest).
85. See Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, The Supreme Court and the Erie Doctrine and
Diversity Cases, 67 YALE L.J. 187, 217 (1957) (in requiring federal courts to apply state common
law in diversity cases, Erie doctrine presumes ability of federal courts to discern state common
law).
86. See id. (judge's knowledge of local law is relatively unimportant factor in achieving
just resolution of lawsuits because lawyers can communicate legal reasoning to judges).
87. Id.
88. See Note, supra note "82, at 757 (state decisions and statutes which embody state's
legal policies are equally available to federal district and circuit judges).
89. See id. at 756-57 (conservation of judicial resources for more important tasks is not
valid rationale for circuit court deference to district court decisions on state law); supra notes
82-83 and accompanying text (in contrast to Supreme Court's discretion to review only matters
of national importance, jurisdiction of circuit courts is largely obligatory).
90. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982) (circuit courts have jurisdiction over appeals).
91. See Note, supra note 82, at 756-57 (though conservation of judicial resources for
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of appeal requires the federal circuit courts to give full independent review
to all matters of law regardless of the state or federal basis of the legal
question. 92
BARiARA J. TAYLOR
more important tasks is valid rationale for Supreme Court deference to district court's state
law determinations, same rationale does not apply to deference by circuit court).
92. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text (federal appellate courts have obligation
to provide full review of legal issues).
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